Zooming in on Romania
Photo credit: Sorin Onișor
By Dolores Iordache
Polarisation in Romania
In addition to the usual political discord (e.g. conservative vs. liberal), Romania is divided between individuals who embrace and promote diversity, inclusion, equality, and other fundamental rights, and individuals who advocate for traditional beliefs (some of which are outdated) that essentially exclude and discriminate against specific vulnerable groups (e.g. ethnic, demographic, etc.). Thus, while most Romanians are very open to welcoming refugees (regardless of their origin; e.g. Syria, Ukraine), and vehemently opposed to discrimination and hate speech, etc., there remains a visible proportion of conservative Romanians with excessive nationalistic views and goals (e.g. a reunified Romania, i.e. post-WWI and pre-WWII; see Figure 1) and xenophobic/homophobic beliefs and attitudes (e.g. antisemitism, anti-immigration, islamophobia, anti-Roma, anti-Hungarian, anti-LGBT, anti-globalization, anti-EU).
Figure 1. Romania after WWII.
The divide was clearly observable in Bucharest on July 9th this year, when both pro and anti LGBT crowds marched for their respective beliefs. The Bucharest Pride march also served as an opportunity to protest against UDMR’s (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania) recently proposed legislation aimed at “protecting children’s rights” by prohibiting minors from being exposed to any non-heterosexual content (so-called “gay propaganda”) in both academic and public spheres. Motivated by similar legislation passed in June 2021 by Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the Romanian bill was passed by the Senate and approved by the Romanian Human Rights Commission in April this year and is pending assessment by the Chamber of Deputies.
Similarly, amid Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, public opinions are divided between a pronounced majority of Romanians who condemn the Russian aggression and welcome/help Ukrainian refugees, and a fraction of Romanians who consider the war a “hoax” fueled by the US’s alleged hidden agenda. The anti-war/Ukraine narrative also includes territorial and potential invasion concerns, as well as refusal to assist Ukrainian refugees as an expression of disagreement with the rights of the Romanian minority in southern Ukraine, which has also sparked controversy in the past few years. Specifically, Ukraine’s adoption of legislation that bans education in Romanian “has damaged relations between Bucharest and Kyiv”. However, unlike members of the LGBTQ+ community, Ukrainian refugees benefit from dedicated open support from the Romanian government (in addition to numerous Romanian NGOs, foundations, local businesses, etc.).
The anti-Ukraine narrative had until recently replaced the otherwise predominant Covid narrative. However, since May 2022, the monkey pox outbreak has been prompting hateful comments, and it continues to propagate in parallel to the war narrative. Given the resemblance with the analogous health related Covid narrative, content linked to Covid is slightly re-emerging. The substantial amount of skepticism and cynicism that dominated the Covid narrative (cf. “plandemic”) also extends to the monkey pox narrative. Case in point, the concept of “politico-medical dictatorship” resurfaces, as do the notions of ‘hoax’ and ‘strategy to control the population’. Additionally, online reactions to the monkey pox outbreak also include a handful of racial slurs targeting mainly the WHO director, homophobic comments, and ridicule directed at the Romanian government.
Top hateful narratives
Hate speech in Romania typically consists of anti-Romanism, homophobia, antisemitism, anti-Hungarian, and anti-migrant (including Islamophobic) sentiment. The most common negative perception is centered around the idea that members of the ethnic and social groups outlined above are not trustworthy. This perception is also reflected in a survey conducted by IRES (Romanian Institute for Evaluation and Strategy) in 2020: 7 out of 10 respondents (aged 18+) expressed little to no trust in the Roma community (70%) and immigrants (72%); lower percentages were obtained with regard to Hungarians (53%) and the Jewish community (44%).
“The anti-Ukraine narrative had until recently replaced the otherwise predominant Covid narrative. However, since May 2022, the monkey pox outbreak has been prompting hateful comments, and it continues to propagate in parallel to the war narrative.”
Anti-Roma narratives tend to be the most prevalent (followed by homophobic speech) and typically include hateful comments related to low employment rates, inconsistent (or absent) tax return filing, and theft. The IRES survey cited above reports a generally negative perception of the Roma associated with the low levels of trust (also noted above). During the Covid-19 pandemic, these negative views were maintained and at times exacerbated by several incidents related to apparent non-compliance with Covid-19 emergency measures (e.g. quarantine; the Roma were largely perceived as non-compliant by the general public). Police brutality against the Roma was reported by NGOs and the media, and videos of the respective incidents were also available online (mainly on Facebook and YouTube). The incidents sparked public outrage and prompted hateful (online) remarks. Despite clear evidence (i.e. video footage) of excessive police force, online comments were almost unanimously in favor of the law enforcement protocol and against the Roma. Interestingly, the survey by IRES also confirms these observations, showing that respondents who reported low levels of trust also considered police force against the Roma as acceptable during the Covid emergency state. Similarly, respondents who reported a negative opinion of the Roma were more likely to perceive the Roma as non-compliant (90% compared to 72% among those with positive perceptions), which suggests that perception is influenced by prejudice. However, the hypothesis that the Roma were considered responsible for disseminating the coronavirus in Romania was not confirmed by the IRES study which indicates that only 9% of the respondents associated the Roma with the spread of the virus. Instead, the respondents assigned more responsibility to the diaspora (32%) and to immigrants (19%).
Homophobic narratives are generally centered around the belief that LGBT rights jeopardize the traditional family model and values, which leads to an obsessive attitude towards (and focus on) “preserving normalcy”. Consequently, significant resistance can also be noted against same-sex marriage and adoption (and freedom of expression through any media, as noted earlier).
Conversely, antisemitism manifests mostly in the form of Holocaust denial (a criminal offence in Romania), though racial slurs can also be encountered on occasion. Anti-Hungarian narratives usually reflect “latent ethnic and sectarian divisions over history and identity.”
Online cases of islamophobia emerged particularly around 2015/2016 (cf. Europe’s refugee crisis and mosque project in Bucharest), and islamophobic attitudes were also reflected in a survey conducted in 2018, which shows that 68% of the respondents had little to no trust in Muslims, while 67% exhibited low tolerance levels. However, compared to discrimination against the other groups, islamophobia has been less prominent in the past two years. When hateful messages do occur, they are either discriminatory or conspiracy-related (e.g. “plot to Islamise Europe”). In some cases, (prompted in particular by two violent incidents in 2021), “refugees and migrants were portrayed as a source of violence, but the focus was less on migrants and more on Romanian authorities perceived as incapable of maintaining public order”. Hateful remarks were more frequent and hostile in response to media reports about refugees and migrants (particularly Muslims) settled in Western countries.
“ Online cases of islamophobia emerged particularly around 2015/2016 (cf. Europe’s refugee crisis and mosque project in Bucharest), and islamophobic attitudes were also reflected in a survey conducted in 2018, which shows that 68% of the respondents had little to no trust in Muslims, while 67% exhibited low tolerance levels”
In addition to social and racial discrimination, sexism and misogyny also represent a recurrent hateful narrative in Romania. The OpCode project identified sexist language in the form of “degrading and stereotypical language [and] encouragement of extreme forms of violence against women,” targeting mainly feminists (“a threat to families”) and female politicians (ridiculed or criticized for their professional abilities). However, hateful comments “reached alarming intensities in the case of public figures who had been victims of some form of physical or sexual abuse”. The hateful remarks “justified the abuse or described it as a form of sanction”, essentially blaming the victims. Such incidents indicate that despite the legislative framework meant to protect women’s rights, Romania is “still dominated by gender inequality, traditionalist views, prejudice, and misogyny.”
Who is responsible to spread hateful narratives in Romania
Hateful narratives in Romania are fueled by right-wing extremist parties such as the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), The New Right (ND), and associations like the Coalition for Family (a Romanian association of approximately 30 NGOs) which promote homophobic and xenophobic attitudes. Conversely, antisemitism has been disseminated by individuals like Vasile Zărnescu (former intelligence officer convicted of Holocaust denial) and Ion Coja (to name but two), a retired senior lecturer at the University of Bucharest, chairman of the extreme nationalist League for Combatting Anti-Romanianism, and a former member (1992–1996) of the upper house of the Romanian parliament.
AUR has been a parliamentary party since 2020, but “its political influence is limited”. This far-right alliance rejects any form of Neo-Marxism, such as political correctness, gender ideology, egalitarianism, and multiculturalism, which AUR labels as the “Neo-Marxist plague”. The doctrine promoted by AUR includes the following four pillars: family, nation, faith, and freedom. Specifically, AUR views gender ideology as a ‘theoretical fallacy’ founded and proliferated by Neo Marxists. As such, AUR argues that a nation’s survival depends strictly on the traditional family model (i.e. marriage between a man and a woman) and that family is not a ‘negotiable matter’, nor is it a problem that must be solved. Similarly, AUR draws on etymology to justify their extreme nationalistic beliefs. Thus, a country is a ‘fatherland’ (cf. Rom. patrie < Lat. pater, father) and a native language (cf. Rom. limba maternă) is a language spoken by a mother (cf. Rom. maternă, maternal as in ‘native’ < Lat. mater, mother). AUR uses these lexical attributes to justify the fixed ideology that defines an individual’s ‘ethnic and historical’ identity. The third pillar (i.e. faith) is described by AUR as a fundamental virtue which excludes atheism and essentially anything that represents a threat to Christianity. AUR vehemently opposes the “persecution campaigns that Christianity has been subjected to in the past decades, anti-clerical acts and attitudes, or obliteration of Christian symbols”. Finally, freedom is defined by AUR as an individual’s ability to express themselves freely based on the aforementioned pillars. Thus, the increased efforts to fight inequality, discrimination, and hate speech are viewed by AUR as a false pretense which ultimately abolishes traditional values. As such, AUR argues that no topics should be considered taboo, therefore rejecting censorship. The descriptions and arguments outlined above denote a strategic use of lexical (words) and semantic (meanings) properties of language to fit a specific agenda. More precisely, the AUR doctrine exhibits characteristics (e.g. rhetorical figures and polarisation) of information that is meant “to manipulate [and to] guide people … in [a questionable] direction” (cf. disinformation), and information that “stems from the truth but is often exaggerated in a way that misleads and causes potential harm” (cf. malinformation).
Like AUR, The New Right is a fervent advocate of traditional values and nationalism. According to ND, only the family model promoted by the Church is “natural”, i.e. “a monogamous heterosexual couple with a reproductive vocation”, which implicitly rejects any other sexual orientation. The official website also reveals (rather indirectly) hostility towards the Roma, abortion, communism, globalization, the European Union, NATO, religious groups other than the Romanian Orthodox Church, ethnic and cultural race, and territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority in Romania. Notably, the nationalistic narratives promoted by both AUR the ND also include the reunification of Romania with Moldova, which has been a trending topic in Romania for a long time, as well as a source of hate speech and division/conflict between Romanians.
“Hateful narratives in Romania are fueled by right-wing extremist parties such as the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), The New Right (ND), and associations like the Coalition for Family (a Romanian association of approximately 30 NGOs) which promote homophobic and xenophobic attitudes.”
Toxic platform in the country
Facebook is the most popular platform in Romania (more than 10 million users), but also the medium through which most of the online toxic content has been reported in 2020 and 2021, followed by YouTube (see Open Code for Hate-Free Communication). Between November 2020 and January 2021, 50 reports of potentially illegal hate speech were filed (23 for YouTube, 27 for Facebook). Most of the hateful content comprised anti-Roma messages (27 reports) or expressed hatred related to sexual orientation (22 reports). Of these, 33 messages contained explicit calls to murder, while 10 messages incited violent acts. Similarly, 59 cases of online hate speech were identified between July 2021 and August 2021 on Facebook. Again, the hateful content reflected anti-Roma sentiments (27 reports), and homophobic/transphobic beliefs (12 reports), though antisemitic messages were also detected (18 reports).
Positive online initiatives
Active efforts to protect vulnerable groups and to prevent hate speech continue to be deployed in Romania. Case in point, a human rights and legal milestone was reached in 2021 with the adoption of an anti-Romanism law aimed at combating hate speech and acts targeting the Roma. Additionally, numerous NGOs are actively involved in various hate speech awareness and prevention campaigns in support of the Roma community: ARESEL, the Civic Union of Young Roma in Romania, and Romani-CRISS (to name but a few). Likewise, support for the LGBT community can also be noted. Romanian NGOs like ACCEPT advocate for LGBT rights persistently. In addition to raising awareness through digital platforms, ACCEPT commissioned a study which shows that “Romanians are increasingly more tolerant towards LGBTI rights”.